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ABSTRACT 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper combines income and expenditure with time use data to provide a unique 
picture of the time paths of labour supplies, saving and full consumption for two-adult 
households over the life cycle. These data are used to test the life cycle model presented 
in the paper, at the core of which is the hypothesis that households face a borrowing 
interest rate that rises sharply with the amount of non collateral based borrowing. The 
household members jointly choose time paths of time use, consumption and saving over 
their life cycle in the face of this capital market imperfection. This model explains the 
data much better than does the alternative hypothesis of a perfect capital market. Finally, 
households are shown to differ significantly in their saving behaviour in a way that 
depends on secondary earner labour supply, with a strong positive association between 
saving and the secondary earner's income. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
The defining characteristic of the standard model of consumption choice over the life 
cycle1 is, as a result of the assumed separability of leisure and consumption, that the 
income generation process is effectively exogenous to the household. As Heckman 
(1974) showed, if this separability assumption is relaxed, the great central “puzzle” of 
the literature based on this model - why current consumption tracks current income so 
closely in the data - is rather easily resolved. Nonetheless, a controversy continues 
over how to resolve this puzzle within a model that takes the only household decision 
variables to be its dated consumptions, with its income stream treated effectively as 
exogenous. 
  
The leading contenders for resolution of this (model-contingent) puzzle seem to be 
precautionary or buffer-stock saving,2 liquidity constraints in the extreme form of the 
complete absence of borrowing possibilities,3 and demographic effects, especially the 
presence of children.4 
  
The first of these argues that, to avoid the consequences of adverse random shocks to 
income in the future, households in the earlier phase of the life cycle build up buffer 
stocks of assets, and then, in their mid-forties to fifties, begin accumulating savings 
for retirement and possibly for bequests. In its purest form, this approach seems to be 
capable of fully explaining the data on household expenditure and saving, in particular 
the tendency for consumption to track income in the early phase, while leaving 
virtually no explanatory role for liquidity constraints on the one hand, and 
demographic factors on the other. Indeed, it implies that liquidity constraints, even if 
they exist, are non-binding. The household does not want to borrow, completely 
deterred by the risk that its future income will fall to zero indefinitely. However, if 
there is a positive lower bound on income (social security, support from other family 
members), the theory allows that consumers might indeed want to borrow, though 
never more than the present value of this lower bound on the income stream.5 In this 
case there may be room for other explanations of consumption behaviour. 
  
Under absolute no-borrowing constraints, an impatient household’s current 
consumption will be constrained by its income, and so will track it over time. As 
opposed to the buffer stock model, households do not borrow because they cannot. 
 
Finally, the demographics approach suggests that if consumption is deflated for 
family size,  it  shows  the  relatively  flat time  profile  consistent  with  the  
permanent   income hypothesis, under which a household uses the perfect capital 
                                                           
1For a comprehensive survey of the theory and evidence on this model see Deaton (1992). Browning 
and Lusardi (1996) provide a more concise survey of saving behaviour. Browning and Crossley (2001) 
and Carroll (2001) give shorter surveys of recent work. 
2See for example Carroll (1992), (1994), (1997), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Hubbard, Skinner and 
Zeldes (1994), and Zeldes (1989). 
3See for example Deaton (1991). 
4See for example Attanasio and Browning (1995), Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and Weber, (1999), 
Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994), and Browning and Ejrnaes (2002). 
5See Carroll (1997). 
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market6 to decouple its consumption and income streams in such a way as to maintain 
constancy of its discounted marginal utility of income over time. Browning and 
Ejrnaes (2002) argue that in this way the data can be fully explained without 
introducing a precautionary motive. 
  
In his recent survey, Carroll remarks that the development of the precautionary 
savings approach brings the life cycle model back to its roots in the work of Milton 
Friedman in the 1950’s.7 Friedman’s analysis was called into question by the results 
of the models of the 1970’s and 80’s, based on explicit intertemporal optimization 
under uncertainty. Carroll argues convincingly that in fact Friedman’s intuitions were 
more closely consistent with the data, and that the recent precautionary savings 
models provide a superior theoretical underpinning for these intuitions.  
 
However, we should take notice of the fact that one of the single most important 
socio-economic developments in the forty-five years or so since Friedman’s work, has 
been the large expansion in female labour force participation, with its far-reaching 
implications for the household’s labour supply and income generation process.8 The 
point which motivates the present paper is that it no longer makes any sense, if it ever 
did, to take the household’s labour income as effectively exogenous.  
 
As long as models of consumption choices are estimated solely on the type of income 
and expenditure data available in family expenditure surveys, it does not seem 
possible to reject the claims made by any of the parties in contention just discussed.9 
However, when we expand the data set to include the household’s time allocation and 
labour supply decisions, as this paper does, we see that, precisely because of the 
importance of female labour supply in the modern household, the assumption of an 
exogenous process of household income determination is no longer sustainable. In 
other words, possible exogenous uncertainty in the income of the primary household 
earner may be small beer compared to the variations in household income generated 
by endogenous choices of secondary  earner  labour  supply.10   This  leads  to  a  
model  which  integrates  life cycle choices of time allocation, labour supply and 
consumption.11 
                                                           
6By which we mean one in which the interest rate is the same for borrowing and lending, is invariant to 
the amount borrowed or lent and to the identity of the economic agent, and has no quantity restrictions 
of any kind. 
7Though it may be worth noting that Keynes also identified the precautionary motive as an important 
reason for saving. It is the first on his list of the motives for saving, see p.107 of Keynes (1936). 
8Interestingly enough though, Friedman (1957), in defining his Permanent Income Hypothesis, is 
careful to refer to the “earners” in his “consumer unit” in the plural. This is perhaps because he does 
not derive his hypothesis from an explicit model of the utility maximising household. Ando and 
Modigliani (1963), on the other hand, in the formulation of their Life Cycle Hypothesis, do so, and so 
treat the household as a single individual, which tradition has been followed in the literature ever since. 
9Thus Browning and Ejrnaes conclude “the data are not informative enough to allow us to convincingly 
distinguish between different explanations for the tracking of income by consumption seen in the 
earlier stages of the life-cycle”. 
10Interestingly, Heckman remarks at the conclusion of his paper “It is also relatively straightforward to 
generalize our results to multiple worker households, although few new analytical insights emerge.” 
This is true only as long as the second worker is just a formal replication of the first, which is not 
actually the case when childbirth is a possibility. 
11The paper by Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2003) adopts an approach similar in spirit to this 
paper, but quite different in detail. It uses a life cycle model with endogenous female labour force 
participation, consumption and saving decisions to explain the changes in female participation across 
three age cohorts in the US. 
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In following up this approach, we do incorporate elements of both demographics and 
capital market imperfections. Decisions on female labour supply are closely related to 
the presence of children and the choice of sources of supply of child care. Moreover, 
it seems possible to explain the data only by assuming some kind of capital market 
imperfection, though our data set, which gives detailed information for each 
household on purpose, source, amount and cost of borrowing, does not support the 
extreme assumption of no borrowing. Also, we certainly would not rule out the 
possibility that some saving could be precautionary in nature, but do not believe, from 
our inspection of the data, that this can be anything like a complete explanation of 
household consumption behaviour over the life cycle. 
  
An important feature of our modelling approach is the characterisation of the life 
cycle not in terms of calendar years, but rather in terms of the phases through which a 
typical family goes over its lifetime. Essentially we are saying that the important 
differences between households at different stages of the life cycle are not captured 
sufficiently sharply by differences in calendar age of the head of the household, but 
rather depend more on whether or not they have children, and on what stage the 
children are at. By organising the data in this way we are trying to bring out more 
clearly than in the existing literature the effects of children on the time allocation and 
labour supply decisions of the household, and, through that, on its income stream and 
saving decisions. Thus, we argue that the time paths of saving and consumption of 
market goods reflect the movements in household income that are determined by 
changes in female labour supply over time, which in turn are determined by the 
process of substitution between market and household work associated with bringing 
up children.12 We then go on to argue that the data strongly suggest that some form of 
imperfect capital market assumption is indispensable to explaining what happens to 
household consumption, saving, labour supply and leisure in the early stages of the 
life cycle. There may appear to be some evidence of “precautionary” saving, in the 
form of a high level of household saving before the advent of children, but, at least in 
the context of the present model, this would be better characterized as “anticipatory” 
saving.13 In anticipation of the major impact that the arrival of children will have on 
family resources, and faced with a capital market that does not offer unsecured loans 
at a reasonable interest rate, young households save at a higher rate than at any other 
time in their lives. 
  
Furthermore, the data indicate that households exhibit very considerable heterogeneity 
in their consumption, labour supply and saving decisions, within and across phases of 
the life cycle. In particular, saving behaviour depends very closely on female labour 
supply. For example, households with no significant female labour supply do virtually 
                                                           
12This bears a superficial resemblance to the model of Baxter and Jermann (1999). They explain the 
tendency for consumption of market goods to track income by arguing that as the wage rate rises over 
the life cycle, goods produced in the household (of which the most important is surely child care) 
become more expensive, and therefore substitution toward market goods takes place. In a sense they 
are spelling out a source of the non-separability between consumption (of market goods) and household 
non-labour time that was the basis for Heckman’s (1974) contribution. However, the problem with this 
theory is that the domestic production is carried out predominantly by the female, whose wage does not 
rise - if anything it tends to fall on average due to depreciation of human capital with nonparticipation - 
over the life cycle. It is important to model two-person households, as we do here. 
13Of course, since in our model there is no uncertainty, precautionary saving in the sense of Carroll and 
Kimball just does not arise. 
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no saving once they have children, other than that involved in house purchase and 
superannuation schemes. Controlling for primary earner income, there is a high 
propensity to save out of secondary earner income. 
  
The paper is set out as follows. In the next section we present two models of the 
household’s decisions on consumption, saving and time allocations over the life cycle, 
which assume respectively perfect and imperfect capital markets. Section 3 then 
presents empirical life cycle profiles of consumption, saving, labour supply and 
domestic work, obtained by combining information on income, household expenditure 
and time use. The results suggest a pattern of full consumption14 over the life cycle 
that is very different from that obtained by studies of expenditure on market goods 
alone. Section 4 presents the empirical specification of the models. Section 5 gives the 
parameter estimates for the within-period demand system and compares simulated 
consumption profiles for the perfect and imperfect capital market models in terms of 
how well they predict the data. As we would expect, the perfect capital market model 
predicts smooth profiles of consumption that in no way matches the data. We then 
show that the life cycle profiles of full consumption and leisure can be closely 
approximated by the imperfect capital market model. Section 6 concludes. 
  
2 The Models 
 
The household has a lifetime of 1T +  periods, with 0 1t T= , ,...,  denoting the period. 
As discussed in the Introduction, and spelled out more fully in the next section, we 
assume that this lifetime is partitioned into phases corresponding to whether children 
are present in the household and, if so, what types of demands they are placing on 
household resources. 
  
It is useful in developing the models to view the household as solving its lifetime 
allocation problem in three steps. First, within each period, it chooses an optimal time 
allocation, given the wage rates it faces and its technology of household production. 
This essentially determines an implicit price of the domestic good. Next, still within 
each period, it chooses a Pareto efficient allocation of consumption of market and 
household goods and of leisure among all current members, including children. This 
then yields an indirect utility function for the household, the key component of which 
is the total income available for full consumption and leisure in each period. The 
household then uses the capital market to choose an optimal intertemporal allocation 
of this income, which determines its borrowing/saving behaviour. Only in this third 
stage is it necessary to distinguish between the cases of perfect and imperfect capital 
markets. 
  
In each period 0t T= ,..., , for any given output of the domestic good hty ,  household h  
chooses its allocations of time inputs ihta  to solve:  
 
2
1
ht it iht
i
minC w a
=
= ∑        (1) 
 1 2( )ht ht ht hts t y f a a k. . = , ;       (2) 
 
                                                           
14Defined as the value of consumption of market and domestically produced goods, but excluding the 
value of leisure. 
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where itw  are net market wage rates. In this problem the subscript 1 2i = ,  refers to the 
adults in the household - only these are assumed to work. The household production 
function may well vary both across time and across households, due to variations in 
human and physical capital, and this is expressed by including the parameter htk . We 
assume the production function is linear homogeneous and strictly quasiconcave. This 
problem therefore yields input demand functions 1 2( )iht t t ht hta w w k y, ; , and total cost 
functions 1 2( )ht t t h htp w w k y, ; ,  with htp  the implicit price of the household good in 
period t.  
  
Defining htc  as household total income
15 in each period, and taking this as fixed for 
the moment, the household solves its within period allocation problem 
  
 
1
( )
K
iht it iht iht iht ht
i
max u x y z uϕ
=
, , =∑      (3) 
 
2
1 1
K
iht ht ht it iht ht
i i
s t x p y w z c
= =
. . + + =∑ ∑      (4) 
 
 
where 1 2i = ,  again denotes the adults and 3i K= ,..,  the children, when present in the 
household. Here x  denotes a market consumption good, and z  leisure.16 The ihtϕ  are 
the household’s welfare weights, which will determine the particular Pareto efficient 
allocation chosen. Given the standard assumptions17 on the individual utility 
functions, ( )itu . ,  it is well known that an alternative interpretation of this household 
allocation process is that the household first shares its full income among its 
members, each of whom then maximises his or her individual utility.18 This is in fact 
the approach adopted in the empirical analysis below, in section 4.1. The main result 
in the present context is that this problem yields an indirect utility function 
1 2( )ht ht t t ht ihtu p w w c ϕ, , , ; ,  with, given the fixed welfare weights, standard properties. It 
is convenient to suppress the exogenously given prices and wages in the indirect 
utility function, as well as the distributional weights, and to write it simply as ( )ht htv c .  
We now consider the two models of the household’s intertemporal choices. 
 
2.1 Model 1: A Perfect Capital Market 
 
There is a single market interest rate at which all households borrow and lend, and 
which is invariant to the amounts borrowed or lent. The budget constraints in each 
period are then  
 
2
1
1
(1 ) 0ht it h t ht t
i
c A w r s s P t T, −
=
= + + − + = ,...,∑    (5) 
                                                           
15The total value of the household’s time endowments at net of tax market wage rates, plus any net 
transfers from government, and plus (minus) any borrowing (lending). It is thus the total available to be 
spent in each period on consumption of market and household goods and leisure. 
16The quantities of leisure for children are set at their total time endowments. 
17Strictly increasing in all arguments, strictly quasi concave. 
18See Apps and Rees (2002) for the details of this formulation in a multi-person household with 
children. 
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where A  is the total time endowment of an adult in each period, hts  is saving ( 0> ) or 
dissaving ( 0< ) at 0 1t T= , ,..., , 0tP ≥  is a lump sum government transfer in each 
period, which in the retirement phase is the pension payment, and r  is the one-period 
market interest rate, assumed constant over time. To be consistent with the 
assumption that there is no bequest motive, which implies saving at zero in the last 
period of life, we also assume there is no inherited wealth, so that assets are also zero 
at the beginning of period 0 . These constraints can be collapsed in the usual way into 
the wealth constraint  
 
 
2
0 1 1
[ ] 0
T K
t
iht it t
t i i
c A w Pδ
= = =
− − =∑ ∑ ∑      (6) 
 
where 1(1 )rδ −= +  is the market discount factor. Introducing a “felicity discount 
factor” ρ,  the household chooses its time stream of full consumption to solve  
 
 
0
( )
T
t
h ht ht
t
maxu v cρ
=
= ∑  
 
subject to its wealth constraint. This is a perfectly standard problem, at least in its 
intertemporal aspect. The non-standard aspects, involving multiperson households and 
domestic production, are subsumed in the form of htv ,  reflecting as it does the 
outcome of the within-period allocation. 
  
2.2 Model 2: An Imperfect Capital Market 
 
There is clearly a range of possibilities in modelling an imperfect capital market. As a 
minimum, we would set the interest rate on saving below that on borrowing. An 
extreme version of an imperfect capital market would have an upper bound on 
borrowing, possibly at zero, as for example in Deaton (1992). However, the following 
formulation would seem both more realistic and consistent with the data we have. All 
households face the same saving interest rate sr ,  and a borrowing rate htr  which is an 
increasing function of the amount borrowed, 0htb ≥ ,  such that  
 
 ( ) ( ) 0 ( ) 0ht htr r b r r
′ ′′= . > , . ≥           (7) 
and  
 0ht ht sb r r> ⇒ >        (8) 
 
for all h t, .  Thus households can borrow, but at an increasing interest rate that is 
always higher than the lending rate. There is no capital rationing in the sense of an 
absolute upper bound on borrowing, but of course the function may increase very 
sharply and ( )b
′ .  could approach infinity asymptotically. Realistically, this borrowing 
function could vary across time and could also contain as arguments the household’s 
income and/or assets, reflecting its default risk and ability to put up collateral for 
loans. However, on grounds of tractability we stay with this simple formulation. Its 
implication is that in equilibrium households may face different borrowing rates at the 
margin, and these rates may vary across periods, depending on the household’s 
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borrowing in each period. Fortunately the data set we have allows us to handle this in 
the estimation procedure. 
 
The utility function, time and household production constraints remain as in the 
previous model. We just have to reformulate the household’s budget constraints. We 
now let hts  denote saving alone. We then have  
 
2
1 1 1
1
(1 ) (1 )ht ht ht it s h t h t h t t
i
c s b A w r s r b P, − , − , −
=
+ − = + + − + +∑    (9) 
  10hT hs s ,−= =       (10) 
  10hT hb b ,−= =        (11) 
  0 0ht htb s all h t≥ , ≥ ,         (12) 
 
 
The intertemporal problem is then  
 
 
0
( )
T
t
h ht ht
t
maxu v cρ
=
= ∑        (13) 
 
subject to the constraints (9) to (12).  
 
Associating Lagrange multipliers htλ  with the constraints (9), the first order (Kuhn 
Tucker) conditions (assuming full consumption is always positive) are  
 
 0t ht ht
ht
v
c
ρ λ∗∂ − =∂        (14) 
 1 1(1 ) 0 0 [(1 ) ] 0s h t ht ht s h t ht htr s r sλ λ λ λ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗, + , ++ − ≤ ≥ + − =       (15) 
 1 10 0 [ ] 0ht ht h t ht ht ht h t htm b m bλ λ λ λ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗, + , +− ≤ ≥ − =      (16) 
 
together with the constraints. Here 1 ( ) ( )ht ht ht htm r b r b b
′∗ ∗ ∗ ∗≡ + +  is the marginal cost of 
borrowing to household h  at time t,  and ( )ht htr r b∗ ∗=  can be called the household’s 
marginal  borrowing  rate.  Asterisks  denote  values  at  the  optimum. We can 
immediately establish the intuitively reasonable19 
 
 
Lemma: The household never both saves and borrows in the same time period. 
 
  
                                                           
19Though of course the data have households both saving, through compulsory superannuation 
payments and financing house purchase, and borrowing short term. The former can best be thought of 
as exogenous amounts that are subtracted from income in the pre-retirement phases, and added back in 
to tP  in the retirement phase, before the household solves its intertemporal optimisation problem. 
Overall this situation of “lending long” and “borrowing short” can be thought of as a further expression 
of the imperfection of the real capital market. 
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Proof: Suppose not, so that 0hts
∗ > ,  0htb∗ > ,  for some t.  Then the first order conditions 
imply  
 
 1 1(1 )s h t ht ht h tr mλ λ λ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗, + , ++ = =       (17) 
 
But this contradicts the assumption that ht sr r
∗ >  and ( ) 0r ′ . > .  
  
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the solution. Point γ  is the initial endowment point. 
The household may lend from there at a constant interest rate sr  to reach an 
equilibrium at a point such as α,  characterised by the first order condition 
  
 
1 1
1ht ht s
h t h t
v c r
v cρ , + , +
∂ /∂ = +∂ /∂        (18) 
 
Alternatively, according to its preferences, the household may borrow along the curve 
rightward from γ  to reach equilibrium at a point such as β ,  characterised by the 
condition  
 
 
1 1
ht ht
ht
h t h t
v c m
v cρ
∗
, + , +
∂ /∂ =∂ /∂        (19) 
 
where htm
∗  is the slope of the curve at the optimal point. Clearly household borrowing 
will be less than if it were possible to borrow at a constant rate equal to sr  (as 
indicated by the broken line). Our contention is that this reduced borrowing accounts 
for the large reduction in leisure and full consumption in the second phase of the 
household’s life cycle indicated by the data.  
 
The key difference between the perfect and imperfect capital market models lies in the 
impact of changes in household per capita income in a given period on consumption 
in that period. In a perfect capital market model that impact is diffused over the entire 
lifetime, leading as it does to a shift in the overall wealth constraint. The effect on 
consumption in the period in which the income change takes place will therefore be 
relatively small. In an imperfect capital market on the other hand, a change in the 
initial endowment point such as γ  in Figure 1 can have a large effect on optimal 
consumption in that period, the more so, the greater the difference between lending 
and borrowing rates.20 As we show in the next section, the arrival of children creates 
just such an income change. For the average household, the reallocation of time from 
market labour to household production resulting from the advent of children causes a 
significant fall in household income, and a large increase in total hours worked, which 
can only be explained in terms of capital market imperfections that do not allow the 
impact of the income change to be smoothed over the entire lifetime. We now go on 
to provide a descriptive picture of life cycle profiles of consumption, saving and time 
allocation, before proceeding to the empirical analysis. 
                                                           
20The extreme case is of course that where there is a no-borrowing constraint, since then the change in 
income translates exactly into a change in consumption when the constraint binds. 
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1t,nC +
α
∑ ++ + 1t1it PwA γ  
β  
*
ntm  
t,nC∑ + tit PwA
Figure 1:  Lending and borrowing in an imperfect capital market 
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3 Evidence on Life Cycle Profiles 
 
The first step in our approach is to define eight phases which seem to us to represent 
the key transitions in the life cycle of a typical household. Given the decision to have 
children, which we take here as exogenous, the life cycle evolves in a way which 
seems to be determined by them. This view of the life cycle leads to a representation 
of the data on labour supplies, consumption and saving for the average household 
which is as familiar to everyday experience as it is foreign to the economics literature 
on lifetime consumption decisions.21 Before they have children, both household 
members have high labour supplies, high saving and plenty of leisure. The presence of 
pre-school children dramatically changes the pattern of labour supply, leading to large 
falls in market labour supply of the secondary earner (usually female), saving, and 
leisure.22 As the children grow up these changes are gradually reversed, with the state, 
through the public education system, taking over a large part of the burden of child 
minding and education, allowing increases in secondary earner labour supply. 
Consumption of market goods steadily increases and borrowing falls, with high 
saving levels again being achieved in the phase immediately after the children have 
left home. A notable feature of the household’s capital market behaviour is the 
substantial long term saving in the form of house purchase, usually mortgage 
financed, and saving for retirement in a (possibly compulsory or strongly tax-
advantaged) contractual scheme, combined with short term borrowing, often at high 
interest rates, which is at its peak when the children are young. Our contention is that 
if the capital market were perfect, the effects of children on labour supplies and on the 
market/domestic consumption mix would be much less dramatic, with higher 
borrowing in the early years allowing substantial smoothing of these paths. We now 
go on to fill in the details of this picture.  
3.1 Data 
Ideally, panel data are required to construct life cycle consumption and saving 
profiles. Since they are not available, we use micro-level cross section data. We 
construct life cycle profiles using information from two complementary surveys, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 1998 Household Expenditure Survey (HES) 
and the ABS 1997 Time Use Survey (TUS).23 The HES contains data collected by 
                                                           
21This is not to say that the importance of “demographics” has been ignored, as we hope our discussion 
in the Introduction has made clear. Our contention is that the effects of having children on female 
labour supply choices, in the presence of an imperfect capital market and costly market child care, are 
much more significant than seems to be recognised in the literature, and that this significance is made 
clearer by the way in which we organise the data. 
22As shown also in Apps and Rees (2001) using 1993-4 data, the true profiles of net income and 
consumption are lost in studies that define the life cycle on the age of the male (or female) partner. The 
key problem is that this definition leads to the aggregation of two-income phase 1 households and 
single-income phase 2 and 3 households with very young children. Averaging across these households 
produces single humped net income and consumptions profiles (see, for example, Figure 2 in 
Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). Blundell et al (1994) note specifically that what is interesting in their 
results is that although female participation falls in the early years, household income does not. 
However, this finding is, we would argue, an artifact of aggregating phase 1 couples and phase 2 and 3 
young families. 
23The analysis is, in effect, based on a single cross section (all results are presented in 1998 prices) and 
therefore does not take account of cohort effects. While we recognise that cohort effects can be 
important, it does not seem to us that they would alter the direction of our key results. 
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interview on household consumption expenditure and individual incomes, earnings 
and hours of work. The TUS provides detailed information collected by diary on time 
allocations to ten activities,24 as well information collected by interview on individual 
incomes and “usual hours of work”. We aggregate the ten time use activities into three 
general categories: market work, domestic work and leisure. In the domestic work 
category there are two sub-categories: child care and time spent on the other domestic 
work activities. Both surveys provide data on a common set of demographic, 
education and occupation variables.  
 
We select matching samples of two-adult households from these datasets. All two 
adult households are included except for those who do not have children and the 
female partner is aged from 40 to 44 years. Our reason for excluding these households 
is that they are likely to represent couples who have decided not to have children and, 
ideally, we would like to exclude all such households. The sample drawn from the 
HES contains 4016 records and from the TUS, 1938 records.25 
  
In addition to income and expenditure data, the HES provides detailed information on 
household debt, house price, mortgage and loan repayments and contributions to 
mandatory retirement saving and to life insurance. The information on loans is highly 
disaggregated, for example, by purpose, type of lender, term of loan, etc. The HES 
also includes estimates of indirect government taxes and benefits as well as the usual 
detailed data on direct taxes and benefits. 
  
The two samples are split into the eight phases on criteria that capture the presence 
and age of children and the later transition of their parents from work to retirement. 
The criteria are also chosen to give phases of nearly equal cell size, for the purpose of 
comparisons across the life cycle. Phase 1 is limited to couples with no dependent 
children and a female partner aged under 40 years. Phase 2 represents families with 
children under 5. Records in this phase are selected on the criteria that at least one 
child under 5 years is present, there are no older children unless there is a child under 
2 years but no child over 9 years. Phase 3 families have at least one child aged 5 to 9 
years and may have a younger child or children in the 10 to 11 year age group. In 
phase 4 the children are predominantly in the 12 to 14 year age group. In phase 5 
families have older dependent children still living at home. There are no children 
present in phase 6 to 8. Phase 6 is defined to include couples in which a partner is 
aged under 55 years or the male partner is under 60 and has a significant workforce 
attachment. Phase 7 is pre-retirement, and represents couples in which the male 
partner is aged under 65, or at least one partner is not fully retired. In phase 8 both 
partners are retired. 
  
                                                           
24The activity episode classification distinguishes between labor market activities and nine major 
categories of non-market activities. Market hours are calculated as the sum of time allocations to all 
subcategories of labor market activities excluding travel to work and job search. Domestic work is 
computed as the sum of time allocations to the categories “domestic activities”, “purchasing goods and 
services” and “child care/minding”. For each episode, information is recorded for a “primary” and, if 
relevant, a “secondary” activity. Where primary and secondary activities are reported, the weighting 
used is 0.6:0.4. 
25There are 102 records excluded from the HES full sample of two-adult households and 52 from the 
TUS sample, on the criteria that no children are present and the female partner is aged from 40 to 44 
years. 
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3.2 The Average Household 
 
 
3.2.1 Income, Consumption and Saving 
 
Table 1 reports life cycle profiles of median net household income,26 expenditure on 
market goods and saving, in columns 1 to 3 respectively, using the HES sample. 
Column 4 gives the average number of dependent children in each phase and column 
5 lists the cell size of each phase.  
 
 
TABLE 1:   Median net income, market consumption and saving*   
         
 
Life cycle   
phase 
Net market 
income 
1 
Market cons 
expend 
2 
Saving 
(1 - 2) 
3 
# dep 
kids 
4 
HES    
cell size 
5 
1 52104 40422 7800 - 449 
2 39676 38765 1040 1.56 508 
3 42120 40393 1872 2.30 518 
4 45292 43417 2652 2.09 510 
5 55120 53680 988 1.71 518 
6 49764 42382 6136 - 501 
7 25740 30817 -2704 - 506 
8 19084 20905 -1352 - 507 
All 40664 38249 1508 - 4016 
 *$pa 1998 
 
 
The excess sensitivity puzzle is confirmed by the profiles in columns 1 and 2, which 
show the strong tendency of household consumption to track net household income, 
with the highest median consumption expenditure coinciding with the highest net 
income in phase 5. 
 
This is brought out clearly in Figure 2. The figure shows that there is first a sharp fall 
in median income as the household moves from phase 1 to phase 2. This is then 
followed by hump shaped profiles of net income and consumption from phases 2 to 8. 
Saving is at its highest in the pre-children phase, drops sharply in phase 2 with the 
arrival of children, and fails to rise to near its phase 1 level until phase 6 when the 
children have left home.  
 
While it is clear that net income and consumption are strongly associated with the 
presence of children, data on these variables alone can give an entirely misleading 
picture of the true paths of income and consumption, and of the impact of 
demographic variation, because they exclude the household’s implicit income from, 
and expenditure on, domestic production. The time use data we now present give an 
indication of the importance of household production. 
                                                           
26Net household income includes all government direct (cash) benefits but not indirect benefits through, 
for example, the education and health systems. 
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3.2.2 Time Allocation 
 
Table 2 reports life cycle profiles of time allocations to market and domestic work. 
The table lists TUS weighted data means for male and female market hours, domestic 
hours and total hours of work, in columns 1 to 6, respectively. Comparing these 
profiles with those for net income and consumption in Table 1, it is immediately 
apparent that much of the variation in net income across phases 1 to 6 reflects changes 
in female labour supply or, more specifically, the reallocation of time from market to 
domestic work by the secondary earner after the arrival of children.  
 
TABLE 2:  Male and female hours of market and domestic work pa 
  
 
Male hours of work Female hours of work 
Life cycle 
phase 
Market 
1 
Domestic 
2 
Total 
3 
Market 
4 
Domestic 
5 
Total 
6 
1 2286 614 2900 1789 1012 2801 
2 2271 1514 3785 681 3416 4097 
3 2266 1504 3770 684 3163 3847 
4 2259 1266 3525 976 2541 3517 
5 2244 928 3272 1057 1987 3045 
6 2220 842 3062 1099 1679 2778 
7 801 1180 1981 414 1769 2183 
8 0 1458 1458 0 1750 1750 
All 1784 1167 2952 811 2169 2979 
 *Weighted TUS data means 
Figure 2:  Median net income, consumption and saving 
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Across these phases there is relatively little variation in male market hours but large 
changes in the hours of the female partner, which are negatively related to domestic 
hours of work. This is shown graphically in Figure 3.  
 
The strong negative relationship between female market and domestic hours suggests 
that the two types of work become close substitutes after the arrival of children. The 
most dramatic substitution occurs in phase 2, reflecting the fact that young children 
generate a high demand for care. This can in general be provided at home or bought 
on the market, but the time use data show that there is a very large domestic supply of 
child care. 
 
 
 
In phases 2 to 5 the female partner allocates, on average, 2198, 1980, 1069 and 471 
hours to child care and the male partner, 935, 860, 520 and 180 hours, respectively. 
Even though family size is larger is phase 3, more time is spent on child care in phase 
2 because of the predominance of children aged 0-4 in that phase.27 The data show 
that total hours of work rise, and therefore that leisure falls dramatically, with the 
arrival of children, and this is then steadily reversed over successive phases of the life 
cycle. 
  
 
 
3.2.3 Full Consumption, Taxes and Benefits 
 
 
When consumption expenditure includes the time cost of domestic production, its 
profile tends to track total hours of work, rather than net income, as shown in Table 3. 
                                                           
27The average number of children aged 0-4 in phase 2 is 1.43 and in phase 3, 0.75. There are no 
children in this age group present in subsequent phases. 
Figure 3:  Male and female hours of market and domestic work
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Column 1 of the table presents a profile of domestic consumption expenditure, 
computed as the product of time allocated to domestic work (including child care) and 
the net wage.28 Column 2 reports the average cost of parental time allocated to child 
care in these phases. 
  
Studies of life cycle consumption usually omit indirect government benefits. These 
are important because they are large (averaging over $11,500 per household in the 
sample), they vary quite dramatically across phases, and they tend to vary inversely 
with the household’s cost of domestic child care. Column 3 of Table 3 reports the 
profile of average indirect government benefits.29 The very high levels in phases 3 to 
5 are due to public spending on education and the child care it provides. Government 
indirect child care and education benefits are shown separately in column 4. Families 
with children at school or in tertiary education receive by far the larger share of 
support. Relatively little is spent on children in the pre-school phase.30  
 
           TABLE 3:  Domestic and full consumption expenditure*  
Life 
cycle    
phase 
Dom cons 
exp. 
1 
Domestic 
child care 
2 
Ind. govt 
benefits 
3 
Govt cc & 
educ ben. 
4 
Taxes-
benefits 
5 
H’hold full 
cons expend 
6 
Adult full 
cons exp. 
7 
1 19439 - 4097 1453 16206 67386 67386 
2 56883 35912 9818 2368 3261 108592 56010 
3 53545 31408 16092 9640 -4076 113646 52659 
4 43437 17292 18841 13132 -5565 108769 57944 
5 35190 9402 18602 12615 639 111728 68946 
6 25980 - 5159 959 15188 79236 79236 
7 28594 - 7064 242 -1924 71583 71583 
8 28722 - 12174 32 -19066 66273 66273 
All 35966 - 11541 4828 37 90132 64572 
 *Weighted means, $pa 1998 
 
In addition, families can face an effective tax penalty in this phase if the mother goes 
out to work.31 Column 5 of the table reports data means for taxes net of government 
benefits (direct and indirect in both cases) in each phase. The profile captures the net 
effect of larger indirect benefits for families with school aged and older children and 
the lower average tax liabilities of families in the early child rearing phases due to the 
withdrawal of female labour supply. 
                                                           
28On the assumption of constant returns to scale of time inputs, the expenditure on domestic 
consumption at the implicit price of domestic output is given by the value of time (measured here as the 
net wage) spent in household production. To obtain the net wage we instrument for the gross wage and 
compute a marginal tax rate from the data on direct taxes and cash benefits. Data on earnings and hours 
are used to compute hourly earnings as the measure of the gross wage. For further details, see Apps and 
Rees (2002). 
29The HES estimate of indirect government benefits covers non-cash benefits and services for 
education, health, housing and social security and welfare. For details of the calculation of these 
benefits, see ABS (2001). 
30Note that the data mean of $9818 for indirect government benefits in phase 2 includes medical costs 
for the birth of a child and post natal care. Note also that part of the $2368 of government spending on 
child care and education in this phase goes to children of school age who are also present in some 
families with a child under 2. 
31This is due to the withdrawal of tax benefits (specifically, Family Tax Benefit Part B) on the income 
of the spouse alone. 
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The life cycle profile of household full consumption, computed to include market and 
domestic consumption32 and indirect benefits, is presented in column 6 of the table. A 
profile of the parents’ full consumption, obtained by subtracting child costs from 
household full consumption, is reported in column 7. Both profiles are depicted in 
Figure 4. Child costs are calculated as the sum of the parents’ time costs of child care 
and government spending on child care and education, plus a share of market and 
domestic consumption (excluding child care) computed for an “equivalence scale” 
that sets the cost of a child to 0.4 that of an adult.33 
  
The U-shaped profile of the adults’ full consumption matches their leisure profiles, 
suggesting that parents cut back on both consumption and leisure, instead of 
borrowing more, in order to support their children in the early child rearing phases. 
The explanation for this that we suggest is that parents face higher interest rates in the 
early child rearing phases, particularly in phase 2, together with a lack of access to 
good quality, affordable market child care.34 Because there is very little government 
                                                           
32To include domestic production expenditure, we combine information on time use from the TUS with 
the consumption data for each record in the HES, instrumenting for male and female leisures. For 
further details, see Apps and Rees (2002). 
33This scale is used elsewhere in the life cycle literature (see for example Blundell et al., 1994) to 
deflate household consumption expenditure. We obtain an estimate of the average full consumption 
costs of children per family of around half that of the adults. Child costs of this order are consistent 
with results for a “sharing rule” in a multi-person model estimated on time use data in Apps and Rees 
(2002). 
34To appreciate the inefficiencies and consequent high cost of market child care, one need only 
consider the impact that government financial support, central planning and regulation has had on 
primary school care and education, and what would have happened to female labour supply and school 
attendance if that sector had been treated in the same way as child care. 
Figure 4:  Domestic and full consumption 
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support for child care and high effective tax rates can apply to the incomes of two-
earner families,35 the household’s optimal choice is, first, to reallocate the mother’s 
time from market to household work, since she generally faces a lower wage rate, and 
secondly, for both parents, but especially the mother, to work longer hours in total, 
and so reduce leisure, in phase 2. 
  
In later years, the cost of children to parents is substantially reduced by public funding 
of education. In other words, when the child reaches school age the public education 
system takes over many of the child-minding activities that the household itself has to 
undertake for pre-school children. This allows the female partner to expand her 
market labour supply, while simultaneously reducing total hours of work once the 
preschool phase is over. This effect is evident in phase 4 and is accentuated in phase 
5. Household income, labour supply and market consumption expenditure all peak in 
phase 5, with teenaged and older children living at home, while saving is at its peak in 
the following phase, when the children have left home but market labour supply is 
still high. Thus, the profile of total hours of work, together with that of adult full 
consumption, is, we argue, to a significant extent an outcome of an imperfect capital 
market and variations in the public funding of the costs of children. Once the children 
have reached school age, access to public education allows parents to maintain family 
consumption without cutting back excessively on leisure.  
 
 
3.2.4 Long-term Saving and Short-term Borrowing 
 
This argument is supported by the data on saving and borrowing and on housing 
available in the HES. These show, on the one hand, how much families must save 
under a mandatory system of superannuation. They also have an overwhelming 
incentive to invest in owner occupied housing if, ultimately, they are to buy housing 
over their life time at an affordable (and in fact very low) user cost. Table 4 lists 
contributions to superannuation and life insurance (column 1) and mortgage 
repayments of capital (column 2) by phase. When the sum of these is subtracted from 
saving, many households are found to be in the position of having to borrow short 
term to finance these forms of long term contractual saving. The median of the 
amounts they must borrow short term in each phase, calculated as the difference 
between saving (column 3 of Table 1) and the sum of mortgage repayments of capital 
and superannuation contributions, is shown in column 3.  
 
The imperative to save for house purchase is indicated by the dramatic decline in debt 
to house price ratio from phases 1 to 8, shown in column 4, which is matched by a rise 
in the percentage of households who own their homes, from 59 per cent in phase 1 to 
95 per cent in phase 8. It is straightforward to show that the user cost of owner 
occupied housing, obtained by discounting repayments of capital and the initial equity 
at the time of purchase, becomes negative over time, due primarily to capital gain in 
                                                           
35Australia now has a combined income tax and family tax benefit system that is effectively a system of 
joint taxation, as, for example, in the US and Germany. However, there is a difference. The system 
applies only to families with children and imposes additional penalties on two-earner families with 
dependent children under 5. Under this relatively new regime, married mothers who work can lose 
around half their earnings in taxes and reduced family payments, and many cannot meet the cost of 
formal child care out of their net incomes. 
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an imperfect capital market and also to low transactions costs relative to private 
rental.36 
 
 
    TABLE 4:  Long term saving and housing debt 
Life 
cycle    
phase 
Super+ 
Life 
1* 
Mortgage repay 
(cap) 
2* 
Saving – 
(mort+super) 
3** 
Housing debt  
%  
4*** 
1 1263 3479 3868 44.4 
2 1461 2766 -2833 39.1 
3 1508 2702 -2381 28.4 
4 1779 2531 -1296 24.6 
5 2812 2316 -2652 14.0 
6 2492 1520 2236 9.1 
7 1047 356 -3315 2.4 
8 123 62 -1404 0.1 
All 1586 1886 -1092 18.5 
 *Weighted data means, $pa 1998   
**Median saving net of mortgage repayments of capital and superannuation contributions, 
     $pa 1998 
 ***Debt to house price ratio 
 
3.3 Within-Phase Heterogeneity 
 
The data show that there is a very high degree of heterogeneity in respect of female 
labour supply and savings behaviour across households with the same wage rates and 
demographics, which is concealed in the overall average figures considered above. 
The underlying idea in the models in section 2 is that households choose lifetime 
paths of male and female labour supplies, saving and consumption of household and 
market goods, given wage rates (net of taxes), interest rates and productivities in 
household production. Differences in domestic productivities across households lead 
to differences in choices of these endogenous variables, for households facing the 
same net wage and interest rates and capital market conditions. 
  
To give an indication of the empirical importance of this heterogeneity we construct 
life cycle profiles for two groups defined according to female labour supply as an 
indicator of domestic productivities. We are limited to this strategy for defining 
household types because of missing data on domestic output.  
 
Ideally, we would like to distinguish between those households in which female 
labour supply is zero or “marginal”37 throughout the life cycle, and those in which it is 
significant and relatively large over the entire life cycle. This categorisation requires 
panel data. Since we have access to cross section data only, we present profiles for a 
sample of “in work” households, with those in phases 2 to 7 partitioned into two 
groups of equal size according to the female partner’s “usual hours of work”. We 
label those in which the female partner is a non-participant or supplies relatively little 
market labour as “Type I: Traditional” and those in which she is employed full-time 
                                                           
36The data suggest that, under these conditions, home ownership is analogous to an annuity with a very 
high rate of return, especially if households minimise transactions costs by rarely moving over the life 
cycle. The preferential tax treatment of owner occupied housing is also a contributing factor but cannot 
alone explain the differential between owning and renting over time if one assumes, implausibly, a 
perfect capital market. 
37In the Heckman (1993) sense. 
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or works relatively long part-time hours as “Type II: Non-traditional”.38 
Heterogeneity in female labour supply is strongly evident only after the arrival of 
children, and so we do not split phase 1. 
  
The sample of “in work” households is selected on the criterion that the male partner 
reports positive hours of work. This yields a sample of 2992 records from the HES 
dataset, and gives cell sizes for phases 1 to 7 of 428, 468, 459, 456 458 435 and 288, 
respectively. In the results to follow, the data means and medians for phase 8 are also 
included, to give complete life cycle profiles. Given our data, we are limited to 
making life cycle comparisons between the two types on the basis of the assumption 
that means and medians in phases 1 and 8 are representative of both. 
  
3.3.1 Time Allocations 
 
Table 5 presents data means for time allocations across the eight phases in the same 
format as Table 2, but with separate results for type I and type II households in phases 
2 to 7. The means for female hours of work reveal a high degree of polarisation across 
these phases, a result we would expect since in the majority of type I households the 
female partner is a non-participant, and in an almost equally large proportion of type 
II households the female partner is employed full time.  
 
 
 
     TABLE 5:  Time allocations* by household type  
         
H’hold Life 
Male hours of work Female hours of work 
Type  cycle 
phase 
Market 
1 
Domestic 
2 
Total 
3 
Market 
4 
Domestic 
5 
Total 
6 
I & II 1 2314 554 2972 1811 1014 2285 
 2 2359 1369 3775 15 4103 4118 
 3 2394 1358 3859 111 3664 3762 
I 4 2415 1185 3600 355 3170 3525 
 5 2362 817 3179 504 2393 2897 
 6 2367 815 3182 670 1781 2451 
 7 1862 1093 2955 0 2026 2026 
 2 2432 1464 3943 1378 2908 4286 
 3 2478 1306 3784 1615 2679 4291 
II 4 2464 1095 3559 1915 2285 4200 
 5 2527 856 3383 2120 1753 3873 
 6 2369 958 3327 2217 1568 3785 
 7 2062 1083 3145 1202 1458 2660 
I & II 8 0 1458 1458 0 1750 1750 
  *Weighted data means, hours pa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
38Part-time employment status is defined as 1-35 hours of work per week and full-time as 35 hours of 
work or more per week. 
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3.3.2 Income and Saving 
 
As for the average household, saving tends to track net income which in turn tracks 
female labour supply. As a consequence, the observed heterogeneity of female labour 
supply is strongly associated with differences in household net incomes and saving, as 
indicated in Table 6.39 Column 1 of the table lists the median net incomes of the two 
household types in each phase, and column 2 reports median saving net of mortgage 
repayments and superannuation contributions. The saving profiles are depicted in 
Figure 5. Holding wage rates constant, non-traditional households are found to have 
higher net incomes due to longer hours of work, and also to have much higher levels 
of saving.40  
 
 
 
         TABLE 6:   Incomes, saving and taxes, by household type  
         
H’hold 
type 
Life 
cycle 
phase 
Net 
income 
1* 
 
Saving 
2* 
H’hold 
private inc 
3* 
Male 
earnings 
4* 
Female 
earnings 
5* 
Inc. taxes-
benefits 
6** 
I & II 
1 52728 4212 67496 37700 28600 12161 
 2 34320 -3536 39884 39000 0 -4280 
 3 37388 -2726 41184 37076 0 -10012 
I 4 40508 -1502 46644 36816 2392 -10923 
 5 48880 -4958 57200 38896 5980 -6033 
 6 48360 3776 60944 35984 6864 9629 
 7 33592 -1095 36556 24700 0 -585 
 2 50180 -1248 61516 37960 20800 5179 
 3 52468 -81 64052 39496 22152 -600 
II 4 55900 -108 68120 37492 25324 -2504 
 5 66820 -261 85904 41496 30004 3243 
 6 58604 6245 75504 31460 29328 13276 
 7 39468 1237 45448 20696 15080 3950 
I & II 8 19084 -1404 4212 0 0 -21698 
  *Medians, $pa 1998 *Weighted data deans, $pa 1998  
 
The gap between the net incomes of the two household types is much narrower than 
between their earnings, due to the tax-benefit system. This becomes evident when we 
compare net incomes in column 1, household private incomes41 in column 3, and male 
and female earnings in columns 4 and 5. Data means for direct taxes net of benefits 
(direct and indirect) are listed in column 6. In phase 3, for example, the traditional 
household receives, on average, a net benefit of $10,012 whereas the non-traditional 
                                                           
39Note that income generated by household production is inherently non-saveable, though to the extent 
that it substitutes for market consumption it may permit higher saving. 
40It may be argued that the gap between the saving of the two types is overstated by these results, 
because households may switch “type”. For example, married women who work and save more in the 
early child rearing phases may become nonworkers in the later phases. Studies of the persistence of 
female labour supply indicate strongly that this is not the case (see, for example, Shaw, 1994). 
41The ABS (2001) defines private income as income from all sources before tax and excluding 
government transfers. 
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household receives only $600, a difference of almost $9,500. In phases 2 and 4 type I 
households gain by over $9,000 relative to type II. 
 
These differences reflect the fact that, ceteris paribus, non-traditional households pay 
much more in income taxes, while receiving relatively little in family payments or 
compensation for the cost of child care.42 The differences become even greater when 
indirect taxes are included.43 In addition, in the retirement phase, with higher levels of 
saving, non-traditional households are less likely to be eligible for the income tested 
age pension. In effect, non-traditional households save for their own retirement and 
contribute to financing transfers and pensions for traditional households, by working 
longer hours and paying higher taxes.  
 
Under this type of regime, small differences in domestic productivities are likely to be 
sufficient to give rise to the considerable heterogeneity in female labour supply 
decisions that we observe. 
  
 
3.3.3 Full Consumption and Leisure 
 
 
Table 7 compares the consumption and leisure profiles of the two household types. 
Columns 1 to 3 list expenditures on market goods, domestic consumption and 
                                                           
42This highly unequal distribution of the tax burden between non-traditional and traditional households 
is a relatively recent phenomenon in Australia, and has been largely a consequence of reducing the 
overall progressively of the tax-transfer system, as in other OECD countries, notably the US. In effect, 
lower rates at the top of the distribution of income have been funded by raising taxes on working 
married women. It is important to see the issue in this context, and not in terms of a conflict between 
non-traditional and traditional households. 
43In all the child rearing phases non-traditional households effectively pay more than $10,000 in taxes 
than traditional households when indirect taxes are included. 
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leisure44, respectively. Traditional households have, on average, much higher 
expenditures on domestic consumption and leisure but lower levels of spending on 
market goods. The total consumption spending of the household, obtained as the sum 
of columns 1 to 3 and indirect government benefits, is shown in column 4. Although 
the household types have close to the same gross wage rates and non-labour incomes, 
the total consumption spending of type I is higher in all phases due to the tax-benefit 
system. 
  
 
To make living standard comparisons, these expenditures need to be deflated by 
prices and demographics45. Here we adjust for the latter by subtracting child costs. 
The result, adult total consumption, is reported in column 5. Again, the traditional 
household is ahead. However, if leisure is omitted, to give adult full consumption 
shown in column 6, the profiles of the two types tend to converge.  
 
TABLE 7:  Consumption and leisure expenditures* by household type  
         
H’hold 
type 
Life 
cycle 
phase 
Market 
cons exp  
1 
Domestic 
con exp 
2 
Leisure 
exp  
3 
H’hold total  
cons** 
4 
Adult total 
cons** 
5 
Adult full 
cons** 
6 
I & II 
1 44495 18477 51663 118576 118576 66909 
 2 39379 60896 27859 138275 84842 56984 
 3 41451 54749 29573 142240 81094 51220 
I 4 45344 46015 34378 145063 92794 58416 
 5 57184 36595 50998 163444 120251 69254 
 6 47027 26388 48984 127172 127172 78181 
 7 37649 31416 57488 133487 133487 75991 
 2 47284 51692 24542 132497 80057 55516 
 3 50527 46873 26070 137994 78454 52384 
II 4 51329 38667 30382 137698 87881 57499 
 5 63344 31354 41641 153903 110931 69292 
 6 50665 30441 35360 121144 121144 85779 
 7 41904 25614 52396 125806 125806 73409 
I & II 8 25365 28722 62652 128978 128978 66273 
  *Weighted means, $pa 1998 **Includes indirect government benefit 
 
3.3.4 Conclusions on Across-Household Heterogeneity 
 
The data we have presented here show that heterogeneity is important. Variation in 
female labour supply, which we hypothesise is due to differences in household human 
and physical capital, is associated with significant differences in saving and the 
division of consumption between household and market goods, though not with wage 
rates or numbers of children. Both types of households of course are affected by the 
inability to use the capital market to smooth the time profile of leisure and full 
consumption. The tax/benefit system however, rather than correcting for this by 
supporting all households in the early child-rearing phases, simply brings about very 
                                                           
44The leisure expenditures are computed for a time constraint of 14 hours per day. For further details, 
see section 5.1. 
45The average number of children of traditional household is slightly higher than that of non-traditional 
households. Traditional households in the “in work” sample have an average of 1.71, 2.42, 2.13 and 
1.79 children in phases 2 to 5, respectively. The corresponding figures for non-traditional households 
are 1.47, 2.07, 1.97 and 1.73. 
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large transfers from non-traditional to traditional households. The implied high 
marginal tax rates on working wives are clearly very questionable on efficiency 
grounds, while it is not a priori clear whether there are gains in equity of the income 
distribution. For this we would need to know exactly how the household productivity 
variations, created by variations in human and physical capital, are correlated with 
female labour supply across households, something about which virtually nothing is 
known empirically. Our own judgement is that policy changes to reduce the tax 
burden on working married women and increase support for families with pre-school 
children would significantly improve both efficiency and equity, as well as increase 
fertility.46  
 
4 Empirical Specification of the Models 
 
To estimate the life cycle consumption choice models presented in section 2 on the 
data described in the preceding section, a number of simplifying assumptions are 
required. In both the HES and the TUS, as in all household survey datasets to the best 
of our knowledge, information on individual consumptions of market and domestic 
goods is missing. While the TUS provides data on adult leisures and child care, these 
alone do not allow the identification of individual preference parameters. Nor do they 
permit the estimation of the parameters of an intra-household sharing rule.47 We 
therefore assign shares of full consumption between adults and children prior to 
estimation. We set the children’ share to the child costs calculated as outlined above, 
and treat these costs as a lump sum transfer from parents. This leaves the within-phase 
leisure and market and domestic goods demands of parents for estimation as a two-
adult household model. 
  
Given that we are estimating a two-adult demand system, aggregation restrictions are 
required that are valid only if family members face the same prices. This condition is 
not satisfied if adult members face different prices (wage rates) for leisure. To deal 
with this problem, we specify the leisures as inputs to the production of a private 
leisure good, z,  that can be consumed by either family member.  
 
4.1 Within-period Demand System 
 
In our view, changes in household preferences over the life cycle are likely to reflect 
the changing needs of children rather than changes in the preferences of the adults. 
Ideally, therefore, we would like to specify a system in which adult preference 
parameters are constrained to be identical across phases, with variation in within-
period demands explained by exogenous prices and the within-period total 
consumption expenditure variable. However, with missing data on output, prices can 
only be set on the basis of some essentially arbitrary assumption on productivity. The 
approach we take here is to allow prices to depend on household specific production 
parameters as well as wage rates and, on the demand side, to introduce preference 
heterogeneity so that we can predict the data. 
  
 
 
                                                           
46See Apps and Rees (1999), (2004), for further analysis and discussion of these points. 
47For a proof, see Apps and Rees (1997). 
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We specify Cobb-Douglas (CD) production functions for leisure, z , and the domestic 
good, y , as  
 
 z z zs σ ξ= +         (20) 
 
 y y ys σ ξ= +         (21) 
 
where 2 2 1 1 2 2( )zs w z w z w z= / +  and 2 2 1 1 2 2( )ys w a w a w a= / + .  Within-period prices, q  
and p , are then computed for each record as functions of wage rates and the 
production parameters specific to each record, together with a scaling factor, 
consistent with the CD form. Using record specific parameters implies that 
unobserved domestic productivity is systematically related to the error term of the 
relevant production share equation. Thus, for example, households in which the 
female partner specialises in domestic work will, ceteris paribus, be found to have a 
larger production share, and therefore a lower domestic price, due to a higher 
domestic productivity.48 
 
We select the Almost Ideal (AI) demand system for estimation of within-period 
preference parameters. Suppressing the household type and phase subscripts, the 
indirect utility function for adult 1 2i i, = , , takes the form  
 
 ( ) (ln ln ( )) ( )i i i i iu q p c c a q p b q p, , = − , / ,     (22) 
 
where ic  is adult i ’s total consumption expenditure. The price indexes ( )ia q p,  and 
( )ib q p,  are given by  
 
2 2
0ln ( ) ln ln 0 5 ln ln ln 0 5 lnz y zz zy yya q p q p q q p pα α α γ γ γ, = + + + . + + .  (23) 
 
 ln ( ) ln lnz yb q p q pβ β, =       (24) 
 
where 0α , jα , jlγ  and j j l x y zβ , , = , , ,  are parameters and the jα  contain a dummy 
variable for the presence of dependent children and an error term capturing preference 
heterogeneity. The restrictions for adding up are 1jα =∑ , 0jβ =∑  and 0jlγΣ = , 
for symmetry, jl ljγ γ= , and for homogeneity, 0jlγ =∑ . Household demands in share 
form are 
 
  
 ln ln ln( ( ))z z zz zy z zS q p c a q pα γ γ β ε= + + + / , +    (25) 
 
 ln ln ln( ( ))y y yy yz y yS p q c a q pα γ γ β ε= + + + / , +    (26) 
 
                                                           
48With this specification there is the potential for parameter bias due to the endogeneity of time 
allocations. However, with missing data on domestic output there is inevitably a trade-off between this 
problem and parameter bias due to omitted domestic price variables. 
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 ln ln ln( ( ))x x xz xy x xS q p c a q pα γ γ β ε= + + + / , +    (27) 
 
where xS x c= / , zS qz c= /  and yS py c= / , and c =  ic∑  , 1 2i = , .  Given adding up, 
we need only estimate the share equations for leisure and the domestic good. 
  
4.2 Intertemporal Demand System 
 
As outlined above, we distinguish eight phases of the household’s life cycle, which 
are defined, and can be broadly described, as: 
  
• 1 1{0 }φ τ= ,.., : the two-person household has no children;  
• 2 1 2{ 1 }φ τ τ= + ,.., : the children are of pre-school age;  
• 3 2 3{ 1 }φ τ τ= + ,.., : the children are of primary school age;  
• 4 3 4{ 1 }φ τ τ= + ,.., : the children are predominantly in the 10-14 year age 
group;  
• 5 4 5{ 1 }φ τ τ= + ,.., :  the household has older dependent children living at 
home  
• 6 5 6{ 1 }φ τ τ= + ,.., : the children have left home and the male partner is 
under 55, or under 60 and not retired;  
• 7 6 7{ 1 }φ τ τ= + ,.., :  the adults are under 65, or over 65 and not retired; 
and  
• 8 7{ 1 }Tφ τ= + ,.., : the adults are over 65, and are both retired .   
 
We assume that within each given phase, the parameters of the utility functions, as 
well as the household welfare weights, remain constant, though they may change 
between phases. The subscript 1 8j = ,..,  will refer to the phase. Introducing the phase 
subscripts into the above indirect utility function we can write it as  
 
 ln( ) 1 8ˆ
( )
t
jt t t j
j t t
cu q p t ja b q p
φ= , + ∈ , = ,..,,     (28) 
 
with  
 ln ( )( )ˆ
( )
t t
j t t
j t t
a q pq pa b q p
− ,, ≡ ,       (29) 
 
The solution to the household’s problem yields the life cycle profile of total income, 
and the estimated demand and labour supply functions within periods can then be 
used to derive profiles of market and domestic consumption, saving and secondary 
earner labour supplies, for the perfect and imperfect capital market models 
respectively. 
 
4.2.1 Perfect Capital Market 
 
Given the assumed functional form for indirect utility, the first order conditions for 
this problem in the perfect capital market case are  
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 1 8
( )
t
jt
j t t t
t j
b q p c
ρ λ φδ = ∈ , = ,..,,     (30) 
 
2
0 0 1
( )
T T
t t
t it t
t t i
c W A w Pδ δ
= = =
= ≡ +∑ ∑ ∑      (31) 
 
 
where W  is “full wealth”. The important thing to note is that the marginal utility of 
total consumption expenditure in each period depends on the prices of the domestic 
good, tp , and leisure, tq ,  and therefore on the wage rates and the domestic 
productivity. Thus the entire time profile of total consumption, as well as its allocation 
within each period as between market and domestic consumption, depends on this 
productivity. The solution of the system is given very simply by 
  
 t t Tc cα=         (32) 
 1
0
T T t T
tt
Wc δ α δ−=
= +∑        (33) 
 8
( )
1 7
( )
t T
T T
t j
j t t
b q p
t j
b q p
ρα φδ
−
, ≡ ∈ , = ,..,  ,      (34) 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Imperfect Capital Market 
 
 
In principle, this problem could be fairly complicated to solve. However, from the 
data, we can establish that, at the margin, the average household is in equilibrium at 
the saving interest rate in phases 1 and 6 to 8, and at borrowing interest rates in phases 
2 to 5. It can also be established from the data that the latter interest rates are higher 
than the former. Denoting the discount factors by ( )t jδ , ,  1 8j = ,..., ,  0t T= ,..., ,  we 
can use these to collapse the single period budget constraints into a lifetime wealth 
constraint, which we write as 
  
 ( )t
t j
c t j Wδ
,
, =∑        (35) 
 
where wealth W  is computed from the full income data and the discount rates. The 
household again maximises utility subject to this wealth constraint, yielding the first 
order conditions  
 
 1 8
( ) ( )
t
j
j t t t
t j
t j b q p c
ρ λ φδ = ∈ , = ,..,, ,     (36) 
 
together with the wealth constraint.   We then have to solve the equations 
  
 ˆ tt Tc cα=         (37) 
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( ) ( 8)ˆT tt j
Wc
t j Tδ δα,
= , + ,∑       (38) 
 8
( 8) ( )
ˆ
( ) ( )
t T
T T
t
j t t
T b q p
t j b q p
ρ δα δ
−
,,≡ , ,       (39) 
 
for the optimal time path of total income. 
  
5 Results 
 
Equations (37) to (39) show how the optimal path of life cycle total income, or total 
consumption expenditure, tc , 1 8jt jφ∈ , = ,.., , depends on the marginal utility of 
consumption in each phase, as a function of the discount factors ( )t jδ , ,  0t T= ,..., , 
and the price index ( )j t tb q p, . We have data that support our hypothesis that the 
majority of households in the child rearing phases, particularly those in the earlier 
phases, borrow short term at an interest rate above the lending rate, and we select 
discount rates consistent with this hypothesis. We compute the prices, tp  and tq , in 
the price index as outlined in Section 4.1 
  
5.1 Demand System Parameters 
 
We estimate the within-period demand system on data for a more restricted sample of 
“in-work” households than that used in the empirical analysis of heterogeneity in 
section 3.3. The sample is selected on the additional criteria that the male partner’s 
usual hours of work are equal to or greater than 25 per week, partners in work report 
earnings from wages/salaries as the primary source of income, and neither partner has 
negative earned or unearned incomes. The sample contains 2151 records.  
 
To avoid parameter bias arising from the endogeneity of earnings, the system is 
estimated on wage rates, net of taxes, predicted from regression models corrected, in 
the case of the female partner, for selectivity.  
 
 TABLE 8:  Demand system parameters 
 
Parameter 
1 
 Estimate 
2 
Std error 
3 
αz0  0.5075 (0.0123) 
αz1 D*  -0.0839 (0.0041) 
αy0  0.2804 (0.0110) 
αy1 D*  0.0385 (0.0038) 
γzz1   0.1226 (0.0176) 
γyy1   0.1037 (0.0117) 
γyz1  -0.1306 (0.0123) 
βz1  0.1416 (0.0085) 
βy1  -0.0986 (0.0072) 
Log L  5294.74  
 * D = dummy variable for the presence of dependent children 
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Full income is defined on the basis of a time constraint of 14 hours per day, which 
means that each adult is given a fixed allocation of 10 hours of “own time” (pure 
leisure and/or sleep), with the residual of leisure time beyond own time being treated 
as an input to the general leisure good, z . Thus, total consumption within each phase 
is the sum of the household’s expenditure on market consumption and on the domestic 
and leisure goods with own time omitted in the latter.  
 
We estimate the system on all records, ignoring corner solutions, on the assumption 
that domestic work is analogous to a particular type of employment. Under this 
assumption, corner solutions are potentially a general problem, arising in respect of 
both market and domestic work choices. Dealing with the issue here is outside the 
scope of the present study. Table 8 reports the parameter estimates of the system. All 
are significant at well above the 5 per cent level. The intercept term, 0α , is set at 
log(20,000). The cost function is concave at data means.  
 
 
5.2 Intertemporal Profiles of Consumption 
 
The approach we apply to evaluate the alternative capital market models is to see how 
well the life cycle profiles of total and full consumption generated by the data can be 
predicted, using the estimated preference parameters and selected discount rates. The 
first step is the construction of a reference adult total consumption profile. For this we 
compute 1 8t jc t jφ, ∈ , = ,.., , using data means for time allocations, wage rates and the 
tax-transfer system in each phase, and median saving in phases 1 to 7. Consumption 
in phase 8 is obtained by compounding up previous saving/borrowing at the relevant 
interest rates. We then compute reference consumption and leisure profiles using the 
parameters of the within-phase production and demand system. 
  
We select a relatively low real lending rate of a quarter of one per cent, which we 
consider plausible for the average lender whose capital income is taxed at a relatively 
high marginal rate. Compulsory superannuation payments and the capital component 
of mortgage repayments are treated as exogenous amounts subtracted from income in 
the preretirement phases (i.e., as taxes), compounded up and added back into tP  in 
phase 8. We compound up contributions to superannuation at a real rate below the 
lending rate, of 0.1 per cent, to take account of the risk associated with choice of fund 
(which is now becoming increasingly evident) in addition to transactions costs. In 
contrast, the capital component of mortgage repayments is compounded up at 1.0 per 
cent, to make an adjustment for the high rate of return to owner occupied housing. 
The results for the imperfect capital market model are derived for real borrowing rates 
of 1.4, 1.6, 1.4 and 1.1 per cent in phases 2 to 5, respectively. Though these rates may 
appear low in absolute terms, they are proportionately much higher than the lending 
interest rate. It is also important to keep in mind that they represent across-household 
averages, and that there is considerable heterogeneity across households in 
saving/borrowing behaviour within each phase, particularly in the early phases. Most 
households will in fact face either much higher or lower rates. 
  
We compare reference profiles constructed in this way with the predictions of the 
models based on the same data means for time allocations, wage rates, taxes and 
benefits, and the saving profiles generated by the models. The preference parameters, 
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j j z y xβ , = , , , are applied to obtain tc  for each model (as set in (32) to (34) and in 
(37) to (39), respectively) and the full set of parameters are then used to predict 
within-period consumption and leisure expenditures. The costs of children computed 
for the reference case are held constant across models. 
  
Table 9 presents the reference profiles for 2-adult total consumption and 2-adult full 
consumption, in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Column 3 lists household full 
consumption in each phase, computed as the sum of that of the adults and the transfer 
they make to the children. Table 10 reports corresponding profiles for the perfect 
capital market model, and Table 11, for the imperfect capital market model.  
 
  TABLE 9:  Reference consumption profiles 
  
 
Life cycle 
phase 
2-adult total 
consumption exp, ct 
1 
2-adult full 
consumption exp 
2 
Household full 
consumption exp 
3 
1 124271 71136 71136 
2 84788 56982 111894 
3 83325 52583 117429 
4 96811 59159 115337 
5 116589 65787 110511 
6 120533 72425 72425 
7 134925 71487 71487 
8 132291 70188 70188 
 
 
 
           TABLE 10:  Perfect capital market consumption profiles  
 
 
Life cycle 
phase  
2-adult total 
consumption exp, ct 
1 
2-adult full 
consumption exp 
2 
Household full 
consumption exp 
3 
1 108554 60081 60081 
2 109262 77310 132212 
3 111285 74734 139569 
4 113254 71690 127866 
5 116847 65966 110692 
6 114954 68308 68308 
7 117440 59918 59918 
8 114187 58229 58229 
 
 
 
TABLE 11:  Imperfect capital market consumption profiles 
 
 
Life cycle 
phase  
2-adult total 
consumption exp, ct 
1 
2-adult full 
consumption exp 
2 
Household full 
consumption exp 
4 
1 123280 65118 65118 
2 84495 56745 111655 
3 82108 51646 116492 
4 95322 58043 114216 
5 115723 65179 109900 
6 130555 79905 79905 
7 133334 61918 61918 
8 129687 68443 68443 
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The profiles of 2-adult total consumption, tc , are compared graphically in Figure 6. 
The reference profile is strongly U-shaped across the phases in which dependent 
children are present, as we would expect from the evidence in Section 3.2. The 
imperfect capital market model predictions match very closely those of the reference 
profile. In contrast, the perfect capital market model predicts that the household will 
smooth total consumption expenditure on an adult per capita basis.  
 
 
 
  
Figures 7 and 8 show graphically the full consumption profiles predicted by the two 
models. Figure 7 illustrates some of the implications of the perfect capital market 
hypothesis. Because the model generates a relatively smooth profile of 2-adult full 
consumption, adding in the costs of the children’s full consumption gives a more 
strongly humped profile of household full consumption across phases 2 to 5 than 
indicated by the data. In other words, evidence of a more humped profile of household 
full consumption across the phases in which children are present is required in order 
to support the perfect capital market hypothesis. The imperfect capital market model 
clearly predicts the data far better.  
 
Figure 6:  Two-adult total consumption profiles 
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Figure 7:  Perfect capital market model
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Figure 8:  Imperfect capital market model
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6 Conclusions 
 
Our descriptive picture of a household’s life cycle time allocation, income and 
consumption, defined in terms not of calendar years, but of key phases in the 
evolution of the family, helps resolve some of the “puzzles” that have been noted in 
the existing literature, but suggests a new one: Why, in the phase in which the 
household has pre-school children, are there such dramatic changes in time 
allocations, consumption and saving? The data on borrowing and interest rates 
suggest that the standard assumption of a perfect capital market is untenable, but so is 
the hypothesis that households do not borrow short-term. By modelling household life 
cycle choices under respectively perfect and imperfect capital markets, we show that 
in the former case we cannot reasonably explain the data, in the latter case we can. 
  
More generally, we are proposing an approach to life cycle saving and consumption 
behaviour, which sees the endogenisation of the income process via female labour 
supply choices, as essential. Although in this paper we have found it useful to ignore 
uncertainty, we certainly would not want to claim that it is unimportant in reality, nor 
that a precautionary motive may not be operative in those phases in which households 
save. Indeed we would see that as an interesting direction in which to develop the 
model we have presented here.  
 
Our results have interesting implications for public policy, at a time when declining 
fertility is seen as the major cause of population ageing and consequential problems in 
sustaining social security programmes, such as Pay-As-You-Go pension systems. 
Greater support for households during the critical early childhood phase could help 
overcome the problems presented by an imperfect capital market and reduce the costs 
of having children. This should be a fruitful area for future research. 
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